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How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks:
Evidence from Chinese Import Competition
James J. Feigenbaum, Harvard University
Andrew B. Hall, Stanford University
We explore the effects of localized economic shocks from trade on roll-call behavior and electoral outcomes in the US
House, 1990–2010. We demonstrate that economic shocks from Chinese import competition—first studied by Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson—cause legislators to vote in a more protectionist direction on trade bills but cause no change in
their voting on all other bills. At the same time, these shocks have no effect on the reelection rates of incumbents, the
probability an incumbent faces a primary challenge, or the partisan control of the district. Though changes in economic
conditions are likely to cause electoral turnover in many cases, incumbents exposed to negative economic shocks from
trade appear able to fend off these effects in equilibrium by taking strategic positions on foreign-trade bills. In line with
this view, we find that the effect on roll-call voting is strongest in districts where incumbents are most threatened
electorally. Taken together, these results paint a picture of responsive incumbents who tailor their roll-call positions on
trade bills to the economic conditions in their districts.
Casting roll-call votes ranks among the most visibleactivities of incumbents, granting them opportunitiesto take clear policy positions and communicate them
to constituents (e.g., Mayhew 1974). Voters care about roll-
call votes, favoring incumbents who compile more moderate
roll-call records (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001;
Burden 2004; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson
and Wright 2000) and exhibiting at least some awareness of,
and preferences over, their representatives’ specific positions on
important votes (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Brady, Fiorina,
and Wilkins 2011). Despite these facts, incumbent roll-call
records display a pronounced within-district divergence, with
Republicans and Democrats offering starkly different positions
regardless of local preferences (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010;
Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2009). Whether because of personal preferences, party whip-
ping, or other forces, “the choices voters face locally mainly
reflect national positions of the parties” (Ansolabehere et al.
2001, 152).
A separate literature in American politics documents how
well economic conditions predict US electoral outcomes (Fair
1978, 2009; Kramer 1971). Voters often “punish” incumbents
for economic shocks, even when they likely played no role in
their creation (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2004; Bartels 2009;
Gasper and Reeves 2011; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010).
Despite the salience of economic conditions to campaigns, we
understand little of the dynamics that occur inside the legis-
lature in response to these conditions, especially when these
conditions change unevenly across localities.1 A hypothesis
linking these two literatures together—one for which we find
consistent empirical support in this article—is that, even if
incumbents generally do not cater their roll-call votes to local
constituents, economic roll-call votes are an exception be-
cause of their unusual importance to voters.
James J. Feigenbaum (jfeigenb@fas.harvard.edu) is a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, as well as a doctoral fellow with
the Harvard Multidisciplinary Program on Inequality and Social Policy. Andrew B. Hall (andrewbenjaminhall@gmail.com, http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com) is
an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University.
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse
.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682151.
1. There is evidence, though, that voters are aware of local economic conditions and use them to inform their beliefs about national economic condi-
tions (Reeves and Gimpel 2012). In fact, Bisgaard et al. (2015) argue that, in Denmark, perceptions of the national economy are driven by hyper-local,
neighborhood-level economic conditions more so than municipality-level conditions. Further, Margalit (2013) shows how individual economic conditions—
particularly job loss—can change a voter’s support for welfare spending.
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To test this hypothesis, and to explore the links between
economic conditions, incumbent behavior, and electoral
outcomes more generally, we study quasi-random, localized
economic shocks to congressional districts. We take advan-
tage of the disproportionate shocks that occur when China
begins exporting a good that a local area of the United States
specializes inmanufacturing. Autor, Dorn, andHanson (2013a)
find that Chinese import competition—or more broadly, any
such exogenous import shock—increases unemployment, de-
creases labor force participation, lowers wages, and increases
use of transfer payment programs and disability programs.2 To
circumvent the problem that places suffering economic down-
turns are likely to experience higher import exposure endog-
enously, we follow Autor et al. (2013a) in instrumenting for
the import exposure that these areas face by using Chinese
exports in these product spaces to other (non-US) countries.
Using geographical information, we disaggregate the commut-
ing zone level data on these shocks and attribute them to con-
gressional districts.
We demonstrate that localized economic shocks from
trade cause a pronounced and consistent shift toward pro-
tectionism on trade bills but no ideological change on other
bills.3 We also investigate the mechanisms underlying this
roll-call shift. By testing for heterogeneity in the effect across
electoral contexts, we demonstrate that it is the result of in-
cumbents tailoring their trade policy roll-call votes specifically
and not the result of electoral turnover in the primary or
general election or the result of incumbents becoming more
liberal generally. Though the cited literature provides good
reasons to believe that voters often blame incumbents for
economic shocks, we find that incumbents avoid electoral
effects in equilibrium, in our case, perhaps because they are
able to take popular positions on foreign trade bills in re-
sponse to these trade-based economic shocks.4 In line with
this view, we establish that the protectionist roll-call response
to negative trade shocks is largest in competitive districts,
suggesting that incumbents are most responsive to local eco-
nomic conditions when there is a real electoral threat.
To illustrate our analysis, consider Representative Howard
Coble (R, NC), who represented the 6th district in North
Carolina throughout our sample period, serving from 1985 to
2015. Coble was a member of the conservative Republican
Study Committee, and later a member of the Tea Party Cau-
cus as well. During the 1990s, Coble was in the top decile for
conservatism on nontrade bills and was a general supporter
of free-trade agreements (including a 1993 vote in favor of
NAFTA). Based on ourmeasures of free-trade support, which
we describe in subsequent sections, during the 1990s Coble
ranked in the top 15% of all House members and in the top
25% among Republicans. But the NC 6th district was hit by a
large, negative trade shock during the 2000s; only 8% of
districts enduredmore severe import competition fromChina.
These shocks were driven in large part by the district’s spe-
cialization in kitchen-cabinet manufacturing and in yarn and
thread mills, two manufacturing subindustries in which Chi-
nese imports rose dramatically during the 2000s. In response,
Coble shifted his voting record on trade toward protection-
ism. While still maintaining a strongly conservative voting
record on other issues—in the 2000s, Coble remained among
the top 10%most conservative representatives in the House—
he broke with party orthodoxy, and with his previous track
record, on trade bills. In 2003, Coble voted against both the
Chile and Singapore free trade agreements. In 2005, he voted
against implementation of the free trade agreement with the
Dominican Republic and Central America, known as DR-
CAFTA. As a result of these and other votes, Coble moved, in
the 2000s, from the top 25% of themost free-trade Republicans
to the bottom 5%—more than two standard deviations more
protectionist than his party’s median. As our formal analysis
will show, Howard Coble is far from alone in this behavior. As
we will establish, Members of Congress (MCs) carefully tailor
their roll-call positions on trade bills in response to localized
shocks from trade.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In
the next section, we discuss the theoretical motivations for
our study and explain why the empirical analyses that we
carry out are relevant for our theoretical understanding of
political processes. Next, we briefly describe the major data
sets used in the analyses. Following that, we explain the tech-
niques we use to measure roll-call positioning on trade bills
and economic shocks from trade. Next we present a series of
2. Notably, while the employment effects are concentrated in the
manufacturing sector, Autor et al. (2013a) show that the wage effects
extend to all sectors of the economy and contribute to a general decline in
average earnings region-wide. Note that it may be that the trade shocks
themselves or, perhaps more likely, effects of the trade shocks like those
identified by Autor et al. (2013a) could drive legislator response. To the
extent that labor is mobile between regions, the effects of these trade
shocks on both economic outcomes and on the political outcomes that we
consider will be diluted. However, the regional economics literature finds
consensus that migration in response to labor demand shocks is both slow
and incomplete (see, e.g., Blanchard and Katz 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko
2005).
3. There are likely other, non–roll-call effects of import exposure on
legislator behavior. However, we are unable to measure outcomes like ITC
lobbying or trade-related speech making.
4. In identifying a way in which anticipatory incumbents are able to
avoid electoral effects in equilibrium, our findings are similar to those in
Clinton and Enamorado (2014), where incumbents are seen to be able to
fend off the effects of the introduction of Fox News by altering their roll-
call behavior.
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empirical analyses investigating the effects of localized shocks
from trade on roll-call voting and electoral outcomes. Subse-
quent to these results, we explore effect heterogeneity that in-
forms theories of legislative behavior and points to particular
causal mechanisms. Finally, we conclude by discussing the im-
plications of these findings.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
How legislators cast roll-call votes—and more generally, how
they structure the policy portfolio they offer to voters—is a key
question in American politics. A central goal of the Demo-
cratic system is to translate the preferences of constituents
into government action through the electoral mechanism. By
forcing incumbents to anticipate reelection needs, regular
Democratic elections are thought to create responsive public
policy. An extensive literature, stemming fromDowns (1957),
formalizes these ideas and predicts that legislators should
cast roll-call votes—in addition to other such activities—in a
manner consistent with the desires of the district’s median
legislator.
Despite this intuitive prediction, a large body of empirical
evidence establishes the failure of the median voter theorem
in US elections. Studying the US House, Ansolabehere et al.
(2001), Bafumi and Herron (2010), Lee et al. (2004), and
McCarty et al. (2009) all show that Democratic and Repub-
lican candidates offer consistently different positions even
when running for election in districts with similar underlying
partisanship. A related literature also explores the surprising
degree to which incumbent positions appear inflexible. Ex-
amining howUSHouse legislators’ positions change over time,
Poole and Rosenthal (2000) conclude: “we find remarkable
and increasing stability . . . . Members of Congress come to
Washingtonwith a staked-out position on the continuum, and
then, largely die ‘with their ideological boots on’” (8). Rather
than adapting to the desires of citizens, incumbents appear to
offer fixed and unchanging platforms. Partly in response to
these findings, so-called citizen-candidate models (Besley and
Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski 1996) offer a compelling
explanation for this rigidity. These models offer a view of
elections in which candidates cannot credibly commit to im-
plementing any policies—or voting on any bills in the legis-
lature—in any manner inconsistent with their own, personal
beliefs. This inability to commit, a relatively extreme but illu-
minating assumption, produces equilibrium outcomes in which
elected legislators are unresponsive to citizen preferences.
Empirical reality is likely to lie somewhere between the
extremes of full flexibility, as in the Downsian model, and
full rigidity, as in the citizen-candidate model. On the one
hand, we know that candidates are likely to come to campaigns
with preexisting views of their own. There is also good evi-
dence that they cannot easily change their positions—even if
voters would prefer different ones than those they offer—
without appearing as “flip-floppers” (Tomz and Van Hou-
weling 2015). On the other hand, we also know that politicians
are highly strategic. Concerned with their ability to gain re-
election (Mayhew 1974), they spend a great deal of effort get-
ting to know constituents, learning their desires, and attempt-
ing to implement them (Fenno 1978).
In this article, we investigate one particularly important
dimension on which, we argue, incumbents are likely to be
flexible: economic policy. Why might we suspect incumbents
to be flexible on economic policy even as they are rigid inmost
of their positions? Our argument is that the unique salience of
economic issues to American voters forces incumbents to
adapt to their districts’ changing desires in this issue area even
as they remain immovable on other issues. A large literature
documents how responsive American voters are to economic
conditions (e.g., Fair 1978, 2009; Kramer 1971). The behavior
of candidates conforms to this belief. Bill Clinton’s campaign
motto was famously “it’s the economy, stupid.” For this rea-
son, we hypothesize that incumbents, though generally in-
flexible in their positions, will be surprisingly flexible on eco-
nomic issues in response to economic conditions, because of
their need to ensure reelection at the hands of voters who care
disproportionately about economic issues. In particular, we
predict that legislators will respond to negative economic
shocks by adopting more protectionist policy positions in or-
der to fend off electoral harm.
Implicit in this argument is the idea that economic shocks
make citizens demand more protectionist policy. Moore,
Powell, and Reeves (2013) study how the economic interests
of constituents might drive legislator preferences, focusing
on the presence of auto workers in a congressional district.
They find that local auto workers influenced roll-call votes of
representatives on two recent salient pieces of legislation
with direct effects on the auto industry: the 2008 bailout and
the 2009 “cash for clunkers” program. However, across other
bills supported by the auto industry and its workers but with
lower salience, the influence of auto workers wanes. Like
Moore et al. (2013), we consider how district-level economic
actors can influence legislator roll-call voting, both overall
and on issue-specific votes. Echoing their results, we find ef-
fects on trade bills but not on other ideological issues. How-
ever, while Moore et al. (2013) find the influence of auto
workers concentrated on high salience bills, our results gen-
eralize to all trade roll-call votes, which includes both high and
low salience bills. The difference could be that trade is gen-
erally more politically salient than bills having to do with the
auto industry; Margalit (2011), for example, shows that presi-
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dential vote shares are especially sensitive to job loss from
foreign competition.
Because we focus on reelection concerns, we also predict
variation in the effect of economic shocks. Though all incum-
bents may be responsive to economic conditions, those most
threatened electorally—that is, those in competitive districts—
should be most responsive. In safer districts, with reelection
prospects more secure, incumbents may be able to revert to
the rigid pattern of positions that the literature has doc-
umented for most issue areas. In addition, in testing for
flexibility, we must be sure to distinguish it from the mecha-
nism of electoral replacement. We may find that, over time,
districts that experience economic shocks see their repre-
sentatives become more protectionist, but we must take care
to investigate whether this ideological shift is the result of
a single incumbent changing her position or the result of
the voters in the district sending a new representative in her
place. Finally, because our hypotheses concern the tailored
way in which legislators respond specifically to trade shocks,
we should not observe shifts in legislator roll-call voting on
nontrade bills if our explanation is correct. We test for this
too in the coming analyses.
In this section, we have provided theoretical motivations,
explained our focus on localized economic shocks, and have
laid out the specific tests we will undertake to learn about
incumbent positioning. We now turn to describing the data
used to perform these tests.
DATA
The analysis draws on five main data sets. We focus on the
period 1990–2010, which comprises the full overlap of the data
sources and contains China’s emergence as a major source
of exports. We divide this period into two decades because the
economic data are aggregated to the decade level. We include
431 House districts in our sample. We drop Alaska’s at-large
district and Hawaii’s two districts from the analysis due to
missing economic data. In addition, we drop Vermont’s at-
large congressional district because Bernie Sanders—who rep-
resented Vermont in the House from 1991 to 2006—is the
only member of a third party in our sample.
The first data set is based on data collected by Autor et al.
(2013a), which measures economic activity and import be-
havior for 1990–99 and 2000–2007. We measure trade shocks
to congressional districts at the decade level in terms of im-
port exposure per worker. More details on the construction
of these measures will be given below. We combine the
County Business Pattern data, which measures the size of
the labor force in each county in a given industry, with in-
dustry and trade partner level import data from UN Com-
trade, which measures the degree of Chinese import compe-
tition faced by a given industry. We spatially merge these
data sets from the commuting zone level to the congressional
district level. We follow Autor et al. (2013a) in measuring
trade shocks for the 2000–2007 period, rather than 2000–
2010, because of the large and negative effects of the Great
Recession on US manufacturing.
The second data set contains the roll-call votes of all US
Housemembers, 1990–2010, and comes from the raw roll-call
vote data collected and organized on http://www.voteview
.com. We use these roll calls to generate district-decade
ideological scalings, using a method described below. These
scalings are computed separately for two decades, the first
spanning 1993–2002 and the second spanning 2003–10.5
By dividing the decades in this manner we ensure that the
roll-call votes cast on behalf of districts are only scaled to-
gether within a single redistricting period.6 To be clear, roll-
call votes are first cast on behalf of a new district one year
after redistricting—hence starting the districts in 1993 and
2003—and roll-call votes cast in the year during redistricting
are cast on behalf of the previous decade’s districts.7 We
merge these scalings with the economic data, and we refer to
the merged decades as the “1990s” and “2000s,” respectively.
The third data set provides information on the topical
content of the bills voted on in the US House, 1990–2010, as
collected and coded in the Rohde/PIPC House Roll-Call Da-
tabase. We merge these codings with the roll-call votes. We
consider “trade bills” to be those with issue codings running
from 540 to 549, what the data set calls “foreign trade bills.”
We do not include “domestic trade bills” as trade bills, due to
the particular foreign shocks we are analyzing.8
The fourth data set is on US House elections, 1946–2010.
This data set draws from a variety of primary sources, as
5. Data constraints prevent us from making the two roll-call decades
symmetric by including 2011 and 2012 in the second decade. The two roll-
call decades comprise the maximum number of years for which we have
information on roll-call votes cast within specific issue areas within a
redistricting period.
6. We have also performed the scalings using 1993–2000 and 2003–
10, respectively, to keep with a more standard definition of “decade”;
the correlation between the two-year cutoff is 0.98 and produces sub-
stantively identical results. We choose to keep in the roll-call data for
2007–10 for purposes of efficiency, but substantively identical results are
obtained using only the exact years for which the economic activity data is
measured.
7. For simplicity, we do not directly account for the few states that
underwent “off-cycle” redistricting during these two decades. Ignoring
these changes biases our effect of interest toward zero, although it is
unlikely to affect estimates much.
8. For example, NAFTA (H.R. 3450 in the 103rd Congress) is con-
sidered a foreign trade bill and is included in the analysis, while the
“Prompt Notification of Short Sales Act” (S. 2120 in the 112th Congress) is
coded as a domestic trade bill and is omitted.
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collected by Dubin (1998) and extended in a series of articles
such as that by Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000).
And finally, the fifth data set covers US House primary elec-
tions, 1946–2010, as compiled by Ansolabehere et al. (2010).9
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Two methods for constructing trade-specific
roll-call scores
We generate roll-call scalings for each congressional district
using two completely separate techniques, both of which yield
the same substantive results. Because the economic shock
data is aggregated at the decade level, we produce these scal-
ings at the decade level, analyzing all roll-call votes cast on
behalf of the district within each decade as defined by redis-
tricting and subject to our data constraints—namely, 1993–
2002 and 2003–2010. Throughout we refer to the scalings
on trade bills as measuring a “protectionist” versus “free
trade” dimension of ideology (a claim we are careful to
validate). While there may be a correlation between being
liberal overall and taking more protectionist positions, our
scalings never assume any such link.
Technique 1: Interest group codings of trade bills. In the
first technique, we scale the roll-call votes MCs cast for their
districts using interest-group codings of free-trade bills. We
collected data on “free-trade” roll calls from the Cato In-
stitute’s “Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the Congress”
report.10 The Cato Institute classifies trade bills into two
categories, barriers to trade and trade subsidies, and it iden-
tifies whether the ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ vote on each bill is the “free
trade position.” We merge these bills with the Voteview
roll-call database, and we calculate the proportion of time
among these bills that each district votes in the “free trade”
direction.11 We focus on trade barrier bills since these are
the ones obviously related to foreign trade shocks in the
















where B is the total number of trade bills voted on in
Congress in a given decade.
There are several advantages to this first technique. First,
it leverages substantive information over the content of bills
to ensure that we are tapping into the free-trade vs. pro-
tectionist dimension. Importantly, while this protectionist
dimension might be correlated with party—we might ex-
pect Democrats to be, on average, more protectionist in the
recent era—it is not constructed using any information on
party. Second, it allows for a simple calculation of the de-
gree to which a district’s representative or representatives
are pro- or anti-free trade, because we can average over the
votes cast for or against the free-trade position. As a result,
this technique avoids the need to apply any modeling or to
make any statistical assumptions. However, in using this
technique we are relying on a single group’s codings of a
select number of bills. To make sure that this does not drive
our results, we also perform all analyses with a second,
completely separate method of coding bills.13
Technique 2: Algorithmic roll-call scaling. The second
technique avoids the use of preexisting group codings but
requires applying a more in-depth algorithm with its own
costs and benefits. In this approach, we generate a simple
scalar summary of each roll-call voting on trade bills and on
all other bills (separately) by decade using a simple regres-
sion of each district’s representative’s (or representatives’)
vote on each bill on district and year fixed effects (Fowler
and Hall 2013). First, we randomly guess the direction of
each bill and code this as 0 or 1 (we can think of these
directions as “left” or “right,” but they are completely ar-
bitrary and not based on party). Given these guesses, the
method estimates a regression of the form
9. Both the primary and general election data sets were generously
provided by Jim Snyder.
10. See http://www.cato.org/research/trade-immigration/congress.
11. For barrier bills, we use the subset of Cato’s bills that match the
PIPC issue area codings. When conducting a placebo analysis with the
trade-subsidy bills, this is not possible because only two of Cato’s trade
subsidy bills are in the foreign trade issue area in PIPC. Thus, for the
placebo, we include all of Cato’s subsidy bills.
12. The majority of bills included by Cato as a trade subsidy are votes
on the Farm Bill and on other farm and crop subsidies. For example, in the
107th Congress, of the six trade subsidy votes identified by Cato, two were
for cuts of subsidies (wool and mohair; sugar, respectively), two were votes
on the Farm bill (the House version and final passage), and another was to
limit farm subsidy payments. The final vote was to defund the Export-
Import bank. While these bills were all related to trade, we do not expect
them to be as linked to trade shocks as the votes on free trade and tariffs
included by Cato in the barrier bills grouping.
13. In practice, almost all estimated results are stronger when using
the CATOScore. We have chosen to present estimates in parallel with this
second scaling to emphasize the robustness of the findings.
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Yibp gi1 db1 εib, (1)
where Yib is a dummy indicating that district i voted to the
“right” on bill b.14 The variables gi and db represent district
and bill fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients on the
district fixed effects summarize how often the district’s rep-
resentative voted to the right or left. For interpretability, we
omit the median district’s fixed effect so that these coeffi-
cients reflect voting behavior relative to the median.
The method then iterates to convergence. Given the es-
timated equation, each bill is checked one-by-one. Those
for which the coefficients on the district fixed effects are
correlated with the observed ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ remain un-
changed, while the others are recoded so that the direction
of the bill is flipped. So, for example, if according to the
district estimates the left-leaning districts voted ‘yes’ on a
bill but the bill is currently coded as a “right”-leaning bill,
the bill is recoded to be “left.” Within a few iterations, the
method converges so that all bills are coded in agreement
with the estimated voting behaviors of the districts. The
result is a simple scalar summary of roll-call behavior. For
more technical details as well as a full battery of validity
tests on regression-based scaling more generally, see Fowler
and Hall (2013).
We only choose this technique over more conventional
options in the present case (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Riv-
ers 2004; Heckman and Snyder 1997; Poole and Rosenthal
1985) because it performs well with small numbers of bills.
This allows us to scale legislators using only trade bills,
even though there are relatively few of these per congress.15
To verify the scalings, however, we have also applied W-
NOMINATE to the trade roll calls by decade.16 The result-
ing scalings correlate with ours at 0.98 but produce noisier
estimates when used in our regression analyses—likely due
to measurement error from the small number of bills. All
of our subsequent findings, however, are substantively un-
changed using either the trade scores or the Cato scores.
Using this regression-based method, we estimate district-
decade scalings for all trade bills and for all nontrade bills,
separately. We call the resulting trade-bill estimates trade
scores, and we rescale them so that they are in percentage
points. Thus, a district with a trade score of210 is a district
that is 10 percentage points less likely than the legislator
from the median district to vote in the rightward direction
on a trade bill.17
Figure 1 compares the estimated trade and nontrade scores
for each decade.18 Though both trade and nontrade bills dis-
play a marked amount of unidimensionality—and the cor-
relation between the two scalings is 0.89—there is clearly
variation in the way that legislators situate themselves on
trade bills versus all other bills.19 Much of this variance could
be the result of fixed constituent interests or personal legis-
lator preferences. However, as the rest of this article shows,
changes in local economic conditions help explain these dif-
ferences too.
Finally, figure 2 shows that the two measures, Cato
scores and trade scores, match well. Data points heap some-
what because the Cato scores take on far fewer values than
do the trade scores.20 Overall, though, the “Cato score” on
barrier bills correlates with our trade score measure at 0.80
and, as we show in the analyses below, produces identical
substantive conclusions as the trade score measure—and
larger effect sizes. This gives us confidence in the robust-
ness of our findings and also in our interpretation of trade
scores as measuring a protectionist-free-trade dimension of
preferences.
Leveraging exogenous economic shocks from
Chinese import competition
The difficulty in understanding many of the effects of global
competition derives in large part from the complexity of
measuring import competition with sufficient variation to
enable empirical analysis. We avoid this problem using both
the variation in regional industrial specialization and the
variation in industry level import mix to measure differ-
14. Since Yib is a binary variable, this regression represents a “linear
probability model.” Since all of the explanatory variables are dummies,
however, this “model” represents a simple set of conditional means.
15. There are 136 total bills across the two decades: 81 bills in the first
decade and 57 in the second.
16. To do so we used the WNOMINATE package in R. Following
convention, we fit the model using two dimensions and then extract the
scores from the first dimension to use as our measure.
17. The most liberal district on nontrade bills in the data set is Flor-
ida’s 23rd district in the redistricting cycle from 1993 to 2002, represented
for the entire period by Democrat Alcee Hastings. The leftmost district on
trade bills, however, is Arizona’s 7th district from 2002 on, represented for
the entire decade by Democrat Raul Grijalva. Grijalva’s stances on free
trade are what might be considered “protectionist.” He voted against the
CAFTA implementation bill (HR 3045), against the US-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement (HR 2739), and against the United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act (HR 2738)—all bills with signifi-
cant Democratic support.
18. A color version of this graph is available in the appendix.
19. Note also that the horizontal axis range differs across the two
decades. This is the result of (a) a greater clustering of positions rep-
resenting a more cohesive Democratic party in the 2000s and (b) the
differing positions of the median legislator across the two decades.
20. In addition to heaping, there appears to be a change in the overall
distribution of points between the two decades, with more distinct clusters
of points in the 2000s than in the 1990s. We suspect that this change is the
result of increasing polarization over the two time periods.
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ential trade shocks at a local economic level.21 Measur-
ing regional industrial specialization is relatively straight-
forward: we count the number of workers in the region in a
given industry relative to all workers in the region. However,
measuring changes in import competition is more complex.
We focus on changes in import competition from China
for two main reasons. First, the rise of China as an Ameri-
can trade partner has been rapid and large, thereby giving
us as researchers the chance to evaluate meaningfully large
economic effects. Between 1992 and 2005, China’s imports
to the United States increased more than 500%, measured
using either US or Chinese data (Amiti and Freund 2010).
The second reason we focus on China and not other major
American trade partners like Mexico or Canada is identi-
fication. The rise of China as a source of import competi-
tion for the United States has been driven in large part by
productivity growth in China and changes in global trade
policy—notably, China’s entry to the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in 2001. While the United States is China’s
main trade partner by total export value, the share of Chi-
nese exports sent to the European Union is similarly large
(17.2% vs. 16.3% according to the WTO). Chinese exports
to Japan and South Korea are also quite large. In contrast,
the United States is the destination of nearly 78% of Mexi-
can exports by value; for Canada, 74.5% of exports by value
are sent to the United States.22 Thus, any increases in Mexi-
can or Canadian exports in any given industry are much
more likely to be driven by conditions within those in-
dustries in the United States.23 If those domestic conditions
also have political effects—weakening special interests or
changing local economies—we would be unable to estimate
the causal effect of trade shocks on any outcomes. While it
would be valuable to measure precisely the political effects
of Mexican or Canadian import competition, we are unable
to do so in our current identification framework.24
Specifically, following Autor et al. (2013a), we define im-










where i is the region (commuting zone), j is the industry
(roughly, four-digit SIC codes), and t is the time period (the
1990s or the 2000s). The subscripts u and c identify US and
Chinese national-level variables, respectively. The number
of workers in region i, industry j, and period t is Lijt. The
total number of workers in the United States working in
industry j in year t is Lujt. Their ratio thus forms the share
of a given industry’s workers in region i. This can be used
to measure the expected exposure to industry-level shocks
21. Naturally, our measure of trade shocks will draw some variation
from differences across regions in terms of overall labor share in manu-
facturing. However, this variation in manufacturing employment explains
only one quarter of the variation in trade shocks. The bulk of the variation
in trade shocks between regions is driven by within-manufacturing spe-
cialization in different industries. While some industries—including foot-
wear, apparel, furniture, and electrical appliances—faced huge increases in
Chinese import competition during our sample period, other industries—
e.g., automobiles—did not.
22. These statistics are from the WTO Country Profiles available at
http://stat.wto.org.
23. These import-export flows were likely also driven by the passage
of NAFTA in 1993.
24. To the extent that our estimates of the effects of Chinese-driven
trade shocks are generalizable to all trade shocks hitting the US economy
and political system, we do provide a rough guide to the possible political
effects of other trading partners.
Figure 1. Legislator voting behavior on trade bills vs. all other bills. Legislator trade scores and nontrade scores are highly correlated (r p 0.89), but
legislators appear to have some leeway to deviate from their overall ideological portfolio when voting on trade bills. Points are colored in a range from dark
gray to light gray, indicating the share of that decade the district is represented by each party (fully light gray districts are always Republican; fully dark gray
districts are always Democrat).
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in region i. Given the high levels of regional specialization at
the industry level, there is large geographic variation across
regions in the potential effects of a given shock to an in-
dustry.
The change from t 2 1 to t of the value of Chinese
imports to United States in industry j is DMucjt. The total
labor force in region i in year t is Lit. Their ratio is then the
import shock from Chinese competition in industry j across
all workers in region i. The product of these two ratios
scales the import shock in a given industry by the exposure
to import competition in that industry and region. Sum-
ming these terms over all industries gives us the total im-
port shock (or import exposure) per worker in a region.25
However, there is clear cause for concern about endo-
geneity with these import shock measures. Import shocks
may be caused by changes in the United States. In particu-
lar, local economic conditions may create an import de-
mand shock, either within an industry or a region, deter-
mining the flow of imports from China and other importing
countries. To address these concerns, we follow Autor et al.
(2013a) and use an instrument that depends both on Chi-
nese import growth to other rich, Western economies,26 as
well as lagged US labor force shares from the previous de-
cade. During this time period, the growth of China’s export
sector was driven by increasing competitiveness of manu-
facturers in China, relative to both the United States and
other Western trading partners (Autor et al. 2013a). Spe-











where we use the o subscript to denote super-national
variables referring to these other rich economies. The first
ratio term is simply the lagged version from the previous
expression and measures the expected exposure to shocks in
industry j in region i in the United States. We assume that
industrial labormix in the previous decade is a good proxy for
industrial labor mix in the current decade. However, unlike
the current employment share, which could be simulta-
neously determined by Chinese trade patterns, the lagged
version is unaffected by Chinese trade shocks. The change
in Chinese imports in industry j and time period t to the
other countries o is DMocjt. We instrument for DIPWuit with
DIPWoit.
Aggregating commuter zone shocks to the
congressional district level
To construct our measures of both import exposure per
worker and the instrument, we follow the methods de-
scribed in Autor et al. (2013a).27 Data from UN Comtrade
allow us to measure both DMucjt and DMocjt. Data from the
25. While increased trade with China and globalization were major
geographically varied shocks to local US labor markets during our sample
period, there were other large changes to the economy as well. Autor and
Dorn (2013) document the large effects of technology and computeriza-
tion of tasks in manufacturing and other sectors. To the extent that these
shocks are correlated, the measured effect of trade shocks in this article
could include the effects of technology shocks. However, as documented
by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013b), the trade and technology shocks are
not highly correlated either over space or time in the United States. The
technology shocks were largest in the 1980s and much more geographi-
cally dispersed than the Chinese trade shocks considered in this article.
26. Specifically, they are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ja-
pan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. This set of countries is chosen
based on data availability.
27. Complicating the construction, product, and industry codes are
reported at different levels of aggregation and specificity in the various
data sources. See Autor et al. (2013a) and especially the data appendix for
a description of how the merging of trade data and labor force data is
accomplished.
Figure 2. Trade scores and Cato scores. Comparison of district-decade trade scores, calculated from an unsupervised roll-call scaling method, to Cato
scores, calculated from the Cato Institute’s coding of bills as pro- or anti-free trade. The measures correlate with each other at r p 0.8.
000 / Legislators and Localized Economic Shocks James J. Feigenbaum and Andrew B. Hall
This content downloaded from 171.64.245.47 on Wed, 15 Jul 2015 13:46:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
County Business Patterns describe employment by industry
and county, which can be aggregated to the various labor
force measures required above.28 However, these measures
are all constructed at the commuting zone (CZ) level, rather
than at the congressional district (CD) level. There are 722
CZs in the continental United States, as compared to the
432 CDs, and every county in the country—urban, subur-
ban, and rural—is assigned to a CZ. Figure 3 overlays the
two: CZs are denoted by the thin gray lines, while CDs are
denoted by the thicker black lines.
Using county-level commuting patterns from the 1990
Census, Tolbert and Sizer Killian (1987) and Tolbert and
Sizer (1996) created groups of counties where residents
were highly likely to commute within the zone and highly
unlikely to commute outside of the zone. Thus, we follow
Autor et al. (2013a) and others in treating CZs as local la-
bor markets and as economically relevant and coherent
regions where, by construction, the majority of the popu-
lation both works and lives in the zone. An economic shock
to part of the CZ should be felt by workers and voters
throughout the CZ.29
To link with our political outcome data at the congres-
sional district level, we spatially merge maps of CZs and
CDs. More details on the data and this merge are available
in appendix B (apps. A–E available online). From the 106th
to the 110th congresses, 129 CDs were wholly contained
within one given CZ; 118 were wholly contained for the
111th congress.30 For these CDs, we assign the import ex-
posure per worker in the whole CZ to the CD. In doing so,
we assume that because the CZ is a relevant economic unit,
the shock is equal across the zone, regardless of whether the
plants or firms directly affected by the growth of Chinese
trade are in a given CD. For the CDs that cross CZ borders,
we assign the average of each included CZ, weighted by the
28. Trade shocks are measured at the commuting zone level, which
are composed of multiple counties.
29. Though there may be spillovers to shocks to neighboring CZs, we
expect the political effects of these spillovers to be second order. We have
two main reasons to think these spillovers are unimportant. First, com-
muting zones are designed to capture the relevant sphere of economic
activity economically, so shocks in one zone are unlikely to affect other
zones (Autor et al. 2013a). Second, voters in one district are, in our view,
unlikely to focus on conditions in other districts if these conditions do not
reflect their own district’s situation.
30. These districts are primarily located in urban centers and are
geographically small. For example, throughout our sample period, both
the MA 7th district and the MA 8th district were located entirely within
the boundaries of CZ 20500, centered on Boston, MA. For another 55 CDs
in the 106th congress and 56 CDs in the 111th congress, between 90% and
99% of the district’s land area was within only one CZ.
Figure 3. US commuting zones and congressional districts, 2000s. Commuting zones are in thin gray lines; congressional districts are overlaid in thicker
black lines.
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CZ’s land area share of the CD.31 For example, between
1992 and 2000, the MA 3rd district was split across CZ
20500, centered on Boston, Massachusetts, and CZ 20401,
centered on Providence, Rhode Island, and Fall River, Mas-
sachusetts. By land area, 70% of the CD was in CZ 20500
and 30% was in CZ 20401.32 Thus, the IPW for the CD is
calculated as the IPW20500#.71 IPW20401#.3.33
Figure 4 presents the graphical distribution of these
trade shocks in the 2000s. As the map shows, there is quite
a bit of variation in the presence and severity of these
shocks. Although some parts of the country (most notably a
broad swath of the agriculture-focused Midwest) have little
manufacturing and thus no trade exposure, major parts of
the Eastern portion of the country, as well as some western
parts, do. More importantly, among the locales with more
manufacturing, there is significant variation in the inten-
sity of their exposure. This helps explain why we observe no
correlation between instrumented trade exposure and par-
tisanship, as shown later in the article.
Estimating causal effects from trade shocks
We are interested in measuring the relationship
Yitp b01b1DIPWuit1Xitb21 εit , (4)
where Yit is the estimated Cato score or trade score for the
representative or representatives from district i in decade t,
and DIPWuit is the import exposure per worker in district i
in decade t. The vector Xit stands in for a possible set of
controlling variables. To isolate the causal effect of these
trade shocks, however, we proxy for DIPWuit using DIPWoit
as an instrumental variable as explained above. Thus we
estimate
Yitp b01b1D^IPWuit1Xitb21 εit , (5)
where D^IPWuit are the predicted values of the trade shock
from the first stage regression
DIPWuitpp01p1DIPWoit1Xitp21 uit . (6)
31. As a robustness check, we assign to each given CD the IPW of the
CZ covering the most area in the district. In addition, we also use detailed
census block population data to weight by population instead of land
share. Results are robust to these alternatives and estimates barely vary.
32. The split for the MA-3 was similar between 2002 and 2010 after
redistricting, with 75% in CZ 20500 and 25% in CZ 20401.
33. As described in the Results section, we cluster our standard errors
at the state by decade level to account for the fact that some CDs are parts
of the same CZ and that some CZs are parts of the same CD.
Figure 4. Distribution of trade shocks, US congressional districts, 2000–2007. Darker areas experienced more negative shocks.
000 / Legislators and Localized Economic Shocks James J. Feigenbaum and Andrew B. Hall
This content downloaded from 171.64.245.47 on Wed, 15 Jul 2015 13:46:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The quantity of interest b1 measures the causal effect of
trade shocks (as measured by import exposure) on trade
roll-call bill voting behavior in the district under two pri-
mary assumptions. First, the instrument must have a first-
stage effect. Figure 5 graphs the first stage (eq. [6]) for each
decade, respectively. In both decades the first stage is ex-
tremely strong. For the 1990s, F p 81.29. For the 2000s,
F p 39.74. Combining the two decades, the overall F-
statistic for the first-stage is 271.97. This suggests that the
division of CZs into congressional districts has successfully
preserved the information from the original CZ-level anal-
ysis in Autor et al. (2013a), and it establishes that the “first
stage” assumption of two-stage least squares is met.
Second, Chinese import exposure in other countries must
not have a direct effect on roll-call voting behavior in the dis-
trict except through its effect on district import exposure—
the so-called exclusion restriction. Autor et al. (2013a) pre-
sent a bevy of theoretical evidence and arguments for why
Chinese exports to other major economies should not affect
local US economies except through its effects on local eco-
nomic conditions via the import shocks with which they are
correlated.34
Correlated product demand between the United States
and other rich countries could be one potential threat to the
exclusion restriction. Consider a simple example: If the de-
mand for sneakers grows in both the United States and
other high-income countries, Chinese manufacturers may
begin producing more sneakers. However, this increase in
demand would also lead to more production of sneakers
in the local labor markets of the United States specializing
in this industry. In fact, as Autor et al. (2013a) point out,
this would lead to an underestimate of the effects of Chi-
nese import competition in the United States, biasing ef-
fects toward zero.35
Negative productivity shocks in the United States could
also drive increased Chinese exports to both the United
States and other high-income countries as Chinese exports
replace the faltering US manufacturers both domestically
and abroad. We find this scenario unlikely given the huge
increase in Chinese exports in a variety of industries over
this time period. China’s share of global manufacturing ex-
ports rose from 2% in 1990 to 12% in 2007. In addition,
China’s annual growth in total factor productivity (TFP)
averaged more than 8%, faster than TFP growth in the
United States or other major economies (Autor et al. 2013a;
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang 2012). Finally, China
also grew as an exporter to the United States relative to
Mexico and other Central American countries, from 40% of
imports to 64% between 1991 and 2007 (Autor et al. 2013a).
If these export decisions do not affect local economic
conditions through other channels, it is unlikely that they
Figure 5. First Stage: Instrumenting for localized trade shocks in congressional districts using Chinese exports to other economies and lagged district labor
force. For the 1990s, F p 81.29. For the 2000s, F p 39.74. Combining the two decades, the overall F-statistic for the first-stage is 271.97.
34. We review the most important of these arguments for our pur-
poses here, but we encourage readers to consult their robustness checks
for more information. For example, they report alternate results using a
gravity model of trade.
35. Autor et al. (2013a) show that the effects of the Chinese trade
shocks are similar in magnitude to the estimated effects of trade shocks
derived from a gravity model of bilateral trade and conclude that import
demand shocks are not a large concern in this setting.
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would affect congressional roll-call voting behavior in the
district. It is rather difficult to imagine why an incumbent
would alter her behavior, or why voters would change their
voting decisions, based on observing Chinese exports to
other non-US economies in a manner separate from ob-
serving the resulting local economic effects.36 Although the
exposure measure does include information on the share of
labor devoted to a particular industry in each district—
which could plausibly be affected directly by Chinese ex-
port decisions in other countries—Autor et al. (2013a) use
lagged labor force information to avoid precisely this issue.
We also report a variety of placebo tests in the analyses
below which suggest—along with their substantive impli-
cations about legislator behavior and electoral outcomes—
that the instrument is not exerting effects on the political
climate except through its profound effects on local eco-
nomic conditions. In addition, several of the analyses focus
on contrasts across districts, which would difference out
any fixed violation of the exclusion restriction.37 For these
reasons, we are comfortable with the IV exclusion restric-
tion assumption for our case.
RESULTS
Localized shocks and protectionist voting
We first estimate the effect of localized economic shocks on
district-level roll-call trade scores, using OLS and two-stage
least squares to estimate equation (5). We include a decade
fixed effect to ensure that we only compare districts within
each decade, and we also control for the share of the decade
that each district was represented by a Democrat, which
significantly increases our precision. Because economic
shocks can matter for electoral outcomes, it is possible that
this variable is post-treatment. However, excluding it from
the regression changes the estimate for the quantity of in-
terest by less than two hundredths of a percentage point
because while it is strongly correlated with roll-call voting,
it is entirely uncorrelated with instrumented trade shocks
(r p 20.01). We therefore include it for purposes of pre-
cision.38
Table 1 presents the main results.39 We focus on the
third and fourth columns—labeled “IV”—which presents
the two-stage least squares results. In these columns, a
$1,000 increase in import competition per worker is esti-
mated to cause a 0.7 percentage-point decrease in the
probability that the district’s representative casts a “right-
leaning” or “free-trade” vote in Congress, according to the
trade score measure, and a larger 2.10 percentage-point de-
crease in the probability that the district’s representative
casts a “free-trade” vote according to the Cato score. A likely
explanation for the fact that the effect size is substantially
larger with the Cato score is that the Cato Institute focuses
on the most salient trade bills, while the PIPC data code a
larger number of trade bills that may go unnoticed by vot-
ers. The Cato-based estimates thus focus on the set of bills
on which members of Congress are most likely to heed the
changing preferences of their constituents, while the trade-
score-based estimates include a larger set of bills, some of
which members of Congress can vote on without pressure
from voters.
For clarity, figure 6 shows this same estimation graph-
ically. The outcome variables—our two roll-call-based scal-
ings—and instrumented import exposure are first residual-
ized with respect to the control variables and then divided
into bins of equal sample size and plotted against each
other, along with lines of best fit.40 The negative relation-
ship between exogenous import exposure and protectionist
voting is clear in both panels.
These are meaningful effects. Consider, for example, a
district that goes from the median level of exposure (1.5;
i.e., $1,500) to the maximum observed exposure (13.3). Our
estimates would predict a decrease of almost 25 percentage
points in the probability that the district’s representative
36. There is the possibility that some members of Congress could have
connections to groups that might care about Chinese exports to other
countries. For example, a member of Congress could be supported by
interest groups who hold business interests in Europe. As a result, these
groups could lobby the member of Congress based on Chinese export
behavior in Europe. We cannot rule out this possibility, although we
would point out that, since the member of Congress is unlikely to be able
to influence economic activity in Europe (or elsewhere), such a pattern of
behavior might be unlikely or at least relatively unimportant.
37. For example, we find that the roll-call response is strongest in
more competitive districts—difficult to explain through an exclusion re-
striction violation but consistent with a story of legislative response to
local economic conditions.
38. When using the Cato score, this control variable is unnecessary
and does not provide the same precision gains. We include it in column 4
for consistency of presentation.
39. The first column shows one reason why the instrumental variables
strategy is necessary. When correlating district economic conditions with
trade roll-call voting directly, little relationship is found. This is likely
because import exposure per worker is itself a function of local economic
conditions. Districts doing worse economically for reasons unrelated to
foreign trade are unlikely to see changes in their roll-call votes on trade
bills, thus attenuating the effect. Our strategy short-circuits this problem
by finding random variation in import exposure, and thus in local eco-
nomic conditions.
40. The residualizing and binning were performed using the binscatter
package in Stata. The program divides variables into bins of equal sample
size and locates the bins in the (x,y) plane at the mean value for each
variable in the bin.
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casts a free-trade vote on a trade bill in response to this
shock, using the Cato score.41 Imagine two otherwise iden-
tical congressional districts, both invested in manufactur-
ing but differing in the particular mix of industries in which
they produce goods. Imagine that Chinese export decisions
produce a negative shock from trade in one of these district
but not the other. The IV results in this section demonstrate
that the affected district’s legislator’s roll-call record on trade
bills will shift noticeably to the left, that is, in the protec-
tionist direction, relative to the otherwise identical district
that suffered no such shock. Economic conditions thus exert
a clear pull on the roll-call votes legislators cast in Congress.
This result does not, however, speak to the mechanisms
underlying this effect. How and why do these shocks affect
trade roll-call voting? We now turn to these questions.
Incumbent response, not electoral effects
As we discussed in the “Theoretical Perspectives” section, one
obvious potential explanation for the link between negative
trade shocks and protectionism is electoral. Perhaps voters
respond to negative economic shocks by “punishing” incum-
bents and replacing them with more protectionist represen-
tatives. This is broadly consistent with both the literature on
economic conditions and voting (Fair 1978, 2009; Kramer
1971) and the literature on shocks and retrospective voting,
which generally finds that voters—rationally or irrationally—
reward or punish incumbents for exogenous shocks (e.g.,
Achen and Bartels 2004; Bartels 2009; Gasper and Reeves
2011; Healy et al. 2010).
Table 2 tests for electoral effects in both the primary and
general election. In the first column, we use the same main
IV specification from equation (5) with the average number
of contested primaries for each decade-district as the de-
pendent variable.42 A $1,000 increase in import exposure
per worker is estimated to cause a 0.4 percentage-point in-
crease in the probability the incumbent faces a primary
challenge, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no effect. In the second column, we use the average
number of “serious” primary contests within the district-
decade as the dependent variable, where we define “seri-
ous” to mean any primary in which the eventual winner of
the general election receives less than 95% percent of all
within-party contributions.43 Again, we find no effect, and
this time the sign is in the opposite direction. A $1,000 in-
crease in import exposure per worker is estimated to cause
a 0.8 percentage-point decrease in the probability of a “seri-
ous” primary challenger, and we cannot reject the null of no
effect.
The second two columns of table 2 explore general-
election outcomes. A $1,000 increase in import exposure
per worker is estimated to cause a 0.8 percentage-point de-
crease in average incumbent vote share and a 0.1 percentage-
point increase in the probability of incumbent reelection,
both substantively negligible effects that we cannot distin-
guish from zero, and again in conflicting directions.
Electoral effects do not appear to be driving the change
in roll-call voting we observe. How do we square this with
the large literature on retrospective voting and economic
shocks? We suspect that two factors distinguish the current
setting from those usually studied. First, these shocks are
highly salient due to their pronounced effects on district
unemployment and income (Autor et al. 2013a). Voters may
therefore be unusually aware of the source of these shocks
and the fact that they are not related to the incumbent’s
actions in Congress. Second, unlike broad shocks to the
whole economy or narrow shocks that have no clear policy
link (e.g., shark attacks), trade shocks offer the opportunity
41. The calculation is (13.3 2 1.5) # (22.10) p 224.78.
42. The data on primary elections come from Ansolabehere et al.
(2010), as updated by those authors. Specifically, we calculate “contested
primary” for district i in decade T as 1NiT ^t∈T contestedit where NiT is the
number of elections in district i in decade T and t indexes election-years,
and contested is an indicator variable for a contested primary.
43. The data for this come from FEC primary sources. We do not
define “serious” based only on the incumbent’s share of primary donations
because separating primary and general donations is inaccurate (and, for
our use, unnecessary).


















Dem share 244.19 .05 244.16 225.78
(1.78) (.07) (1.75) (1.47)
N 862 862 862 862
Decade fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Localized economic shocks from trade cause more protectionist roll-
call voting. State-decade clustered standard errors are in parentheses. IPW
is measured in thousands of US Dollars. IV p two-stage least squares
results.
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for incumbents to respond and thus to mitigate electoral
effects in equlibrium.
We now turn to evidence for this hypothesized incum-
bent response. In the first column of table 3, we reestimate
equation (5) using legislator roll-call scores on all nontrade
bills. We find no effect of import exposure on voting be-
havior on other roll calls. As we reviewed in the “Theo-
retical Perspectives” section, this suggests that incumbents
are catering their trade roll calls specifically in response to
economic shocks. Since partisan affiliation is a central pre-
dictor of roll-call behavior, the lack of an effect on nontrade
bills strongly suggests that districts are not changing the
party of their representative in response to shocks, too, in
line with the electoral analysis above.44
In the second column we employ a similar placebo test
using the Cato Institute’s rating on trade-subsidy bills. These
trade subsidies concern issues largely unrelated to US man-
ufacturing—like agricultural subsidies—and so should not
be linked to trade shocks that affect the district manufac-
turing sector. As the table shows, we find a precise null effect
on this placebo test.
For completeness, the third column presents the esti-
mated results when we use the difference between the district’s
trade score and nontrade score as the outcome variable. The
estimated effect (20.75) is similar to the original estimate
using just the trade score as the outcome variable (20.7) and
in fact somewhat larger in magnitude, again suggesting that
overall changes in the district—either a switch in the in-
cumbent party or an overall ideological shift on the part of
the incumbent legislator—do not drive the main result we
observe.
A final possible mechanism is that districts react to trade
shocks by replacing the incumbent with a new co-partisan
who, while mirroring the previous incumbent on nontrade
bills, is more protectionist in terms of trade policy. We
know this is unlikely because the electoral analysis showed
no changes in the likelihood of primary contests or serious
primary challenges. The fourth and fifth columns test this
another way by estimating the effect only among districts
that always have the same incumbent for the entire decade.
Using both trade scores and the Cato scores, we see that the
effect remains large and negative even in these districts.
Hence, primary election turnover is not the explanation.
With these other possibilities rejected, we conclude that
incumbents react to these shocks by differentially changing
their roll-call behavior only on trade bills. This is the only
mechanism consistent with the findings in tables 2 and 3.
In districts that never change their incumbents, we still see
the presence of a negative trade shock leading to signifi-
cantly more liberal voting on trade bills, using both the
tradescore and the Cato score. It must therefore be the case
that incumbents change their voting behavior on trade bills
in response to localized economic shocks from trade.
44. Further bolstering this view, a regression like that in equation (5),
with Dem Frac as the outcome variable, shows that there is a precisely
estimated zero effect of trade shocks on the proportion of the decade that
the district has a Democratic representative.
Figure 6. Impact of trade shocks on trade roll-call voting, US House 1990–2010. Each point represents an equal-sized bin of instrumented import exposure
and the given roll-call score for district-decade observations. With both measures of trade roll-call voting, exogenous import exposure is seen to cause more
protectionist (more negative) voting. The plot represents a nonparametric version of the IV regressions in table 1, corresponding to equation (5). For more
information on how the plots were constructed, see note 40.
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Taken together, these results paint a picture of respon-
sive incumbents who tailor their roll-call positions on trade
bills to the economic conditions in their districts. This helps
explain why, in equilibrium, we find no electoral effects. In
addition to direct gains from tailoring their roll-call votes,
the observed change in voting behavior may also be a proxy
for a variety of ways in which the incumbent can stave off
electoral penalty. Legislators may introduce new legislation,
behave differently in committee, secure federal grants, per-
form specific constituency service, and act inmany other ways
that could help demonstrate to constituents that they are
responding to negative shocks from trade in the district. We
see the roll-call response that we observe as a primary indi-
cator of incumbent responsiveness more generally—keeping
in mind that roll-call voting is itself one of the incumbent’s
most visible and thus most potent available actions.
Beyond interpreting the revealed preferences of incumbents
from their response to these trade shocks, are there theoretical
reasons to believe voters would reward incumbents for re-
sponding to negative trade shocks in this manner? There is
good evidence that voters’ preferences for redistribution, for
example, change in response to economic conditions (Bisgaard,
Sønderskov, and Dinesen 2015; Brunner, Ross, and Washing-
ton 2011; Doherty, Gerber, and Green 2006) and job loss
(Margalit 2013).45 If the tailored response of incumbents is
rooted in this kind of “electoral connection,” we might expect
the effect to be largest when incumbents are most threatened
electorally. This testable prediction, studied in the next sub-
section, addresses one part of why we find responsiveness on
trade roll calls.
Roll-call response stronger in more
competitive districts
Incumbents respond to localized economic shocks from
trade by moving to the left on trade bills. Do they do so in
response to electoral pressure? Or do incumbents change
their roll-call behavior because of personal preferences, na-
tional party platforms, or other such factors? To investigate
these questions, we study the variation in the effect across
levels of electoral competition.
In the first four columns of table 4, we estimate the effect
only in “safe” districts (Republican and Democratic, re-
spectively). We define “safe” to mean districts in which the
1992 (for the first decade) or 2002 (for the second decade)
US House Democratic vote share is above 0.6, for Demo-
cratic safe districts, or below 0.4, for Republican safe dis-
tricts.46 In the fifth and sixth columns, we restrict the sam-
ple to competitive districts, defined to be those where the
1992 or 2002 US House Democratic vote share was between
0.4 and 0.6. Here, we find that a $1,000 increase in import
exposure per worker causes a 1.29 percentage-point de-
crease in the district’s trade score and a 3.01 percentage-
point decrease in the district’s Cato score—effects larger
than in the main results from table 1 and much larger than
the effects in safe districts for either party. Though telling,
we should be cautious in interpreting these results, as they
are noisy. While the negative effects in competitive districts
are estimated to be roughly twice as large in magnitude for
each score (21.29 vs. 20.66 for the trade score outcome,
23.01 vs. 21.59 for the Cato score outcome), we cannot
45. Though unrelated to the arguments in their article, Milner and
Tingley (2011) also find that unemployment appears to be negatively
correlated with voting for foreign trade in Congress, although the coeffi-
cient on unemployment is not statistically significant.
46. To avoid any post-treatment issues, we only use Democratic vote
share for US House in the first year post-redistricting for this “normal
vote.” We do not use presidential vote share because for the 2000s this
would only be available in 2004, already post-treatment.
Table 2. Economic Shocks and Incumbent Electoral Outcomes, US House 1990–2010










worker (IPW) .004 2.008 2.008 .001
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
N 862 862 862 862
Decade fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Shocks have no effect on primary or general-election outcomes, in equilibrium. State-decade clustered standard errors are in
parentheses. Estimated from 2SLS as described in equation (5). IPW is measured in thousands of US Dollars. Outcome variables are
share variables running from 0 to 1. IV p two-stage least squares results.
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reject the null hypothesis that the effect is equal across safe
and competitive districts.
Figure 7 presents the same general results graphically for
each of the two roll-call measures. First, the dependent
variable is residualized with respect to the control variables
and divided into bins of equal sample size. These bins are
compared to equal-sized bins of instrumented import ex-
posure, also residualized with respect to the control vari-
ables. This procedure is applied separately to competitive
districts and to all safe districts, both Democratic and Re-
publican.47 The panels also include lines of best fit for both
sets of districts. As the panels both show, the slope for
competitive districts appears to be more negative than for
safe districts, suggesting greater roll-call responsiveness.
The more threatened an incumbent is electorally, themore
she modifies her trade voting based on localized economic
shocks from trade. This reinforces the notion that incumbents
are responding to trade shocks for electoral reasons, at-
tempting to fend off the electoral threat these shocks present.
Media coverage and incumbent responsiveness
In the same spirit as this last analysis, we also examined
whether incumbents were more responsive on trade bills in
districts where voters receive more media information about
incumbent behavior, using the media congruence measure
from Snyder and Stromberg (2010). This measure reflects the
proportion of news stories in the local media that pertain to
in-district political behavior (and not to politicians in other
districts) and thus measures how much information voters
have easy access to about their own representatives. We re-
estimated equation (5), subsetting the sample to only districts
with high or low levels of media congruence, respectively.
Unfortunately, the results were too imprecise to warrant
presentation, although we do present them in section C of
the appendix. Districts with high levels of congruence, and
thus more information about incumbent behavior, do seem
to exhibit higher levels of responsiveness on trade bills,
though we draw no strong conclusions due to the impreci-
sion of the estimates.
CONCLUSION
Using new data on congressional district trade shocks and
new scalings of districts based on foreign-trade bills, we
have shown how incumbents in the US House respond to
localized economic shocks. We circumvent the usual in-
ferential problem—namely, that economically depressed
areas are likely to differ from other areas in their ideology—
by using quasi-random variation in local economic condi-
tions, obtained by leveraging differential shocks from Chi-
nese export behavior across industries (Autor et al. 2013a).
In response to these shocks, incumbents vote more to the
left, toward protectionism, on foreign trade bills. This find-
ing is consistent using a regression-based scaling technique
on trade bills and using interest group codings of the free
trade position on trade bills.
The observed changes in voting patterns are not the
result of electoral turnover in the primary or general elec-
47. The residualization and binning were performed using the
binscatter package in Stata. The program divides variables into bins of
equal sample size and locates the bins in the (x, y) plane at the mean value
for each variable in the bin.
Table 3. Economic Shocks and Congressional Voting: Testing Theories of Legislative Behavior, US House 1990–2010
All Districts All Districts All Districts Districts with Same Incumbent












worker (IPW) .05 .42 2.75 2.98 22.36
(.17) (.70) (.33) (.51) (1.05)
Dem share 225.81 215.04 218.34 244.14 225.31
(.57) (2.82) (1.34) (1.78) (1.56)
N 862 862 862 571 571
Decade fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. State-decade clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated from 2SLS as described in equation (5). IPW is measured in
thousands of US Dollars. IV p two-stage least squares results.
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tion, nor do they result from incumbents becoming more
liberal overall in their voting behavior. As such, the findings
point to the targeted roll-call strategy incumbents deploy in
response to economic shocks. This response, as we have
shown, becomes more pronounced in districts where the
incumbent is most worried about reelection.
Roll-call votes are only one arrow in the incumbents’ quiver,
but they are an important one, and one that voters appear
to care about (e.g., Ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Brady et al.
2011; Canes-Wrone et al. 2002). The findings in this article
shed light on how incumbents structure the roll-call profile
they present to voters at reelection time. Economic conditions
exert a discernible pull on the ideological positions incumbents
of both parties take on trade policy. Incumbents are thus
surprisingly responsive to district conditions, even if they are
relatively unresponsive to constituent preferences on average
(e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2001).
This position-taking behavior presumably helps incumbents
remain in office, as we find no electoral effects from economic
shocks related to trade. This runs counter to the robust finding
across numerous political studies that economic fluctuations
correlate with incumbent performance, even in cases where
Figure 7. Impact of import exposure on trade scores across levels of electoral competition. Trade shocks appear to cause a larger increase in protectionist
voting in competitive districts, those where incumbents face a more pressing electoral threat. The plots represent nonparametric versions of regressions like
those in table 4. For more information on how the plots were constructed, see note 47.
Table 4. Economic Shocks and Congressional Voting across District Normal Vote: US House, 1990–2010















worker (IPW) 2.58 22.37 2.66 21.59 21.29 23.01
(.42) (.99) (.77) (1.46) (.63) (1.27)
Dem share 230.02 215.39 254.88 238.61 240.23 223.68
(4.23) (8.11) (6.94) (14.73) (1.85) (2.24)
N 312 312 324 324 226 226
Decade fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. State-decade clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated from 2SLS as described in equation (5). IPW is measured in thousands of
US Dollars. IV p two-stage least squares results.
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the incumbent cannot be plausibly held accountable for the
factors producing the fluctuations. Economic shocks from
trade are somewhat unique, we suspect, in the opportunity
they present to legislators to address their potential electoral
effects. Incumbents can respond to these shocks by oppor-
tunistically altering voting behavior on pertinent bills while
holding the rest of their position-taking portfolio constant.
We suspect that other kinds of shocks could result in similar
equilibrium effects, when they relate to coherent issue areas
within which incumbents can tailor policy positions while
leaving their overall ideological portfolio intact.
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